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Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” prophesies the inescapable collapse of many human enterprises. The emergence and 
abundance of cooperation in animal and human societies is a challenging puzzle to evolutionary theory. In this work, we introduce 
a new decision-making criterion into a voluntary public goods game with incomplete information and choose successful strategies 
according to previous payoffs for a certain strategy as well as the risk-averse benefit. We find that the interest rate of the common 
pool and the magnitude of memory have crucial effects on the average welfare of the population. The appropriate sense of indi-
viduals’ innovation also substantially influences the equilibrium strategies distribution in the long run. 
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Cooperative behaviors are a trademark of both insect and 
human societies [1]. These behaviors are explained by kin-
ship in the former and unknown mechanisms in the latter. 
Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” indicated the 
overuse of public resources leads to an inevitable collapse 
of cooperation among non-kin populations; for example, in 
the drive to reduce pollution and sustain global climate [2]. 
Moreover, the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) has long been 
viewed as a typical example to show the disintegration of 
cooperation through pair-wise interactions. However, con-
spicuous examples of cooperation (although almost never of 
ultimate self-sacrifice) also occur where relatedness is low 
or absent [3]. 
For the purpose of studying qualitatively interactions 
between humans, a public goods game (PGG) has been used 
by economists, social scientists and evolutionary biologists 
as a paradigm to explain maintaining cooperation in a group 
of unrelated individuals [4–7]. In a typical PGG, an experi-
menter endows four players with 20 money units (MUs) 
each. The four players then have the opportunity to invest 
part or all of their money into a common pool. The experi-
menter doubles the total capital in the common pool and 
divides it equally among all players regardless of their in-
vestment. If everyone cooperates and invests all the money, 
each player ends up with 40 MUs. However, every player 
faces the temptation to defect and to free-ride on the other 
player’s contributions by withholding the money, because 
each MU returns only half to the investor. If all the players 
were perfectly rational, they would invest nothing. Such 
behavior attributed to Homo economicus varies considera-
bly from experimental evidence [4]. Note that for pair-wise 
players with a fixed investment amount, the PGG reduces to 
the PD. 
Recently, various mechanisms have been proposed to 
explain the persistence of cooperation in the absence of ge-
netic relatedness. For example, repeated interactions and 
direct reciprocity [3,8], indirect reciprocity [8–10], punish-
ment [11,12], reward [13], and the structured population 
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have been suggested [1,14]. Voluntary participation may 
provide a way to escape from the economic stalemate and 
maintain substantial levels of cooperation in a large popula-
tion without secondary mechanisms [5,15–19]. This volun-
teering PGG considers three types of players: (1) coopera-
tors C and (2) defectors D, both willing to join the PGG, the 
former contributes a fixed amount to the common pool, 
while the latter attempts to free ride on the others’ invest-
ment and contributes nothing; (3) loners L, who are unwill-
ing to participate in the PGG and obtain a fixed small pay-
off. In other words, loners are risk averse investors. 
Traditionally, most researchers concerned with coopera-
tion in social dilemmas focus on imitation or learning rules, 
with the central argument that an individual could compare 
their payoff	 with that of others, randomly choose a role 
model, and take over the strategy of the role model with a 
certain probability [7,20–30]. Game theory has been an in-
teresting subject in recent years [31–34]. We would position 
the procedure of decision making among the games of in-
complete information:  
In a fictitious game, player i has the weight function up-
dated by adding 1 to the weight of a strategy each time it is 
played [23]. Moreover, in the expected weighted attraction 
model, the strength of hypothetical reinforcement of strate-
gies is considered players who make decisions not accord-
ing to payoffs they would have yielded. However, without 
any information of their von Neumann neighborhoods, how 
does a person make decisions if they only know their own 
payoffs in each round in the rule of PGG? In other words, 
what is the decision-making criterion for a person with in-
complete information, who only obtains their own infor-
mation? 
In this work, we introduce a new decision-making crite-
rion to show the procedure of cooperation maintenance. 
Numerical simulation of this evolutionary mechanism illus-
trates that historical experience is a large factor when a 
person chooses an appropriate strategy. Moreover, com-
pared with random selection, a proper length of retention is 
more conducive to the welfare of the whole population. The 
simulation also indicates that cooperation is on a substantial 
level, which means this introduction is an illusion of free 
ride behavior, irrespective of the initial conditions. 
1  Model 
Here, we consider the voluntary PGG in a spatial lattice 
with periodic boundary conditions. The players are arranged 
in the rigid regular two-dimensional square lattice with 
10000 members and interact with their von Neumann 
neighborhoods only. The von Neumann neighborhoods are 
the nearest players to each lattice point. 
Confined to a site x on the lattice with incomplete infor-
mation, player x chooses a strategy according to their own 
historical records. The profit of player x then depends on 
their strategy as well as the choices of their neighbors. Con-
sidering a single PGG involving the player and their four 
nearest neighbors, the payoffs for different strategies are 
then determined by the five strategies. Namely, if nc, nd, nl 
(with nc+nd+nl=N=5) denote the numbers of C, D and L 
players, then the net payoff of cooperator Pc, defectors Pd, 
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The cooperative investments are set to unity and r de-
notes the interest rate of the common pool. In particular, if 
only one player joins the PGG (i.e. nc+nd=1), the solitary 
player will be accounted as a loner. For a voluntary PGG 
deserving its name, we must have 1<1+K<r<N. In the rig-
orous sense of the spatial PGG, the payoffs to each player 
are accumulated by summing the player’s performance in 
PGGs taking place on the player’s site and neighboring sites. 
For convenience, we assume that the payoff for a player is 
the average value of the payoffs obtained over all the games 
they take part in. Note that this simplification does not 
change the system’s dynamics. 
Confined to a site x on a square lattice, player x uses a 
mixed strategy: sx(pl, pc, pd), which means probability dis-
tribution over pure strategies. Obviously there is the nor-
malization condition: 
l,c,d
1  ii p (pi ≥ 0), where pi rep-
resents the probability that player x chooses the i strategy. 
That is to say, at each decision stage, all the players will 
come up with one of their feasible actions with their pre- 
assigned probabilities. From time to time, player x reas-
sesses and updates their mixed strategy according to the 
payoffs which they obtained in the previous rounds, i.e. 
from their historical experience. They increase the probabil-
ity of the last round strategy if the payoff satisfied them, and 
vice versa. But when do they feel satisfied? In our model, 
all the players will realize that they can obtain a small but 
fixed income in the long run when they refuse to join the 
PGG. They also remember their decisions and deficits along 
with profits for a certain strategy in each round from the 
beginning until now. Then it is safe to say that each player 
will remember their average payoff for a certain choice: 
( C, D, L)iP i . In our model, we suppose that each player 
updating their mixed strategy will compare their last 
round’s payoff with their decision criterion: the better earn-
ing of K and iP . Assuming that player x choose the i 
strategy in the last round, the evolution of the mixed strate-
gy is then given by 
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The parameter ω denotes the magnitude of memory, i= c, 
d and j =d, c (i.e. the opposite i strategy), respectively. 
Hence, the players in our model can choose the strategy 
which has been successful during the game’s history. In 
addition, as former researchers have done [24], we postulate 
that the players have the possibility to explore available 
strategies, and define µ as the probability that players 
choose a random strategy. 
2  Numerical simulation 
Simulations were carried out for a population of N= 
100×100 individuals. In the quantitative analysis, numerical 
simulations were performed to investigate the frequencies 
of cooperators and defectors when this decision criterion 
was introduced into the PGG. Figure 1 shows that this 
mechanism can maintain the evolution of cooperation to 
avoid dilemma. Obviously, when r→2, most people view 
quitting the game as their best choice. When r→5, coopera-
tion means the greatest benefit for all players. Moreover, if r 
= 5, each player knows that defection is a reasonable choice 
only if they alone make this decision. Every player faces the 
maximum temptation to defect and to free-ride on other 
players’ contributions. 
Thus from Figure 1, we can see that when r gets close to 
5, the average frequency of defection is higher than 40%. 
Figure 2 shows that the payoff of defection approaches 2.2 
when r = 5, which means that if the player is smart enough  
 
 
Figure 1  (Color online) The average frequencies of cooperators C (green 
triangles), defectors D (red diamonds) and loners L (black squares) in a 
spatial voluntary public goods game as a function of r in one model. The 
parameters are K =1, ω =0.01 and µ =0.0001. 
at this value, they will definitely take part in the game, re-
gardless of the probability of the random choice. As Figure 
1 shows us, most players participate in the game; the fre-
quency of loners is close to zero. Additionally, when r is 
small, the decision-making criterion for a certain player is 
the fixed payoff K of the loner. The frequencies of C, D and 
L are the same as in former research [17]. In Figure 2, pay-
offs of cooperators C and defectors D increase as r moves 
from 2 towards 5, and this result conforms to the instinct of 
players in real life, when they know the interest rate of the 
common pool. Compared with previous results [17], the 
payoffs increasing monotonically with r are more reasona-
ble.  
In the remaining text we will discuss how the magnitude 
of memory ω and the mutation rate μ affect the welfare of 
all the players. When ω→∞, the behaviors of individuals 
are only influenced by the historical payoffs of a certain 
strategy, which means the players are myopic. The rule in 
this case is similar in spirit to Win-Stay-Lose-Shift rules. 
When ω→0, the present round payoffs cause only a minor 
effect on the evolution of mixed strategies, i.e. the players 
have longer memories. More precisely, the magnitude of 
memory represents the individual’s sensitivity to their 
neighborhood. The lower the ω value, the more slowly an 
agent will react to their surroundings, and vice versa. Thus 
for a low ω value, even if individuals cannot make more 
money than loners, they will still keep their original action 
for a very long time. Consequently, the population may not 
obtain very efficient outcomes in the long run. Conversely, 
for a high ω value, the individuals are mainly affected by 
current payoffs, and the C clusters will collapse immediate-
ly once they are invaded by defectors D. That is to say, the 
strategy is unable to correct mistakes, and like tit-for-tat [3], 
an accidental defection would lead to a breakdown in coop-
eration, which decreases average outcomes of the popula-
tion. We conclude that an appropriate magnitude of memory  
 
 
Figure 2  (Color online) The average payoffs of cooperators C (green 
triangles), defectors D (red diamonds) and loners L (black squares) in a 
spatial voluntary public goods games as a function of r in one model. The 
parameters are K =1, ω =0.01 and µ =0.0001. 
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is helpful to promote outcomes of the collectives. In general, 
it may result in a more efficient outcome for the population 
when ω is approximately 10 (Figure 3). In fact, the result 
suggests that both the behavior of marching in lockstep and 
focusing on short-term goals will go against the develop-
ment of the population in a real-life situation. It is also in 
close accord with the conclusion of a previous study [17].  
The value of µ characterizes the probability that an indi-
vidual makes their decision randomly. For µ→1, the indi-
vidual is completely irrational and their decision is random.   
 
 
Figure 3  (Color online) The average payoffs of population in a voluntary 
public goods game as a function of ω in one model. The parameters are K 
=1 and µ =0.0001. 
Apparently, the only equilibrium is the equal abundance 
frequency in all strategies. For smaller µ, the mutation rate 
causes minor modifications in the equilibrium of the system 
when r >	3, whereas it affects the equilibrium significantly 
when the value of r is small (Figure 4). The single extreme 
value in Figure 4 is much more credible than Figure 4(a) 
from [17] where there are two extreme values. 
3  Conclusion 
In this work, we introduce a new yet simple evolution 
method to spatial voluntary public goods games with in-
complete information, resulting in interesting dynamic 
properties. 
In our model, players are considered to know only their 
payoffs in each round. They adjust their mixed strategies 
continually according to their decision-making criterion: the 
better earning of the risk-averse benefit K and the history of 
payoffs for a certain strategy. If they are satisfied with their 
payoffs, their probability of using the previous round strat-
egy in their mixed strategies increases, and vice versa. Thus, 
this rule is no longer myopic. By introducing this criterion, 
we found that both the interest rate of the common pool and 
the magnitude of individuals’ memory have an important 
effect on the evolution of cooperation. To maintain the best 
welfare of the whole population, people should choose an 
appropriate magnitude of memory.  
 
 
Figure 4  (Color online) The average frequencies of loners (black square), cooperators (green triangles), and defectors (red diamonds) in a voluntary public 
goods game as a function of µ in one model. The parameters are K =1, ω=0.02 and r =2.5, r =3.0, r =4.0, r =4.8. 
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Meanwhile, our simulation results suggest that in a re-
al-life situation, people make decisions from their own his-
tory of experience and from those of neighborhoods, which 
implies that the heterogeneity of individuals is due to the 
different environments in which they live. A person may 
make a different choice as their environment changes. With 
this evolution rule, the proportion of cooperation is on a 
substantial level, which reduces free ride behavior in enter-
prise decision-making. 
This work was supported by the National High-Tech Research and Devel-
opment Program of China (2009AA043703), the National Natural Science 
Foundation of China (91023045), the Center for Asia Studies of Nankai 
University (AS1005) and the Development Fund of Science and Technolo-
gy for the Higher Education in Tianjin (20100908). 
1 Trivers R. Social Evolution. Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin-Cummings 
Pub Co, 1985 
2 Hardin G. The tragedy of the commons. Science, 1968, 162: 
1243–1248 
3 Axelrod R, Hamilton W. The evolution of cooperation. Science, 1981, 
211: 1390–1396 
4 Fehr E, Gchter S. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 2002, 
415: 137–140 
5 Hauert C, De Monte S, Hofbauer J, et al. Volunteering as red queen 
mechanism for cooperation in public goods games. Science, 2002, 
296: 1129–1132 
6 Ledyard J, Kagel J, Roth A. The Handbook of Experimental 
Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995 
7 Szabo G, Fath G. Evolutionary games on graphs. Phys Rep, 2007, 
446: 97–216 
8 Trivers R. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quart Rev Biol, 1971, 
46: 35–57 
9 Nowak M, Sigmund K. The dynamics of indirect reciprocity. J Theor 
Biol, 1998, 194: 561–574 
10 Nowak M, Sigmund K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image 
scoring. Nature, 1998, 393: 573–577 
11 Wedekind C, Milinski M. Cooperation through image scoring in 
humans. Science, 2000, 288: 850–852 
12 Gintis H. Game Theory Evolving. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000 
13 Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck H. Reputation helps solve the 
‘tragedy of the commons’. Nature, 2002, 415: 424–426 
14 Hauert C, Doebeli M. Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of 
cooperation in the snowdrift game. Nature, 2004, 428: 643–646 
15 Hauert C, De Monte S, Hofbauer J, et al. Replicator dynamics for 
optional public good games. J Theor Biol, 2002, 218: 187–194 
16 Szabo G, Hauert C. Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial 
public goods games. Phys Rev Lett, 2002, 89: 118101 
17 Xu Z, Wang Z, Song H, et al. Self-adjusting rule in spatial voluntary 
public goods games. Europhys Lett, 2010, 90: 20001 
18 Xu Z, Wang Z, Zhang L. Bounded rationality leads to equilibrium of 
public goods games. Phys Rev E, 2009, 80: 61104 
19 Xu Z, Wang Z, Zhang L. Bounded rationality in volunteering public 
goods games. J Theor Biol, 2010, 264: 19–23 
20 Schlag K. Why imitate, and if so, how. A boundedly rational 
approach to multi-armed bandits. J Econ Theory, 1998, 78: 56–65 
21 Nowak M, Bonhoeffer S, May R. More spatial games. Int J Bifurcat 
Chaos, 1994, 4: 33–56 
22 Nowak M, Bonhoeffer S, May R. Spatial games and the maintenance 
of cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 1994, 91: 4877–4881 
23 Funenberg D, Levine D. The theory of learning in games. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1998 
24 Traulsen A, Hauert C, De Silva H, et al. Exploration dynamics in 
evolutionary games. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 2009, 106: 709–718 
25 Wang Z, Xu Z, Huang J, et al. Maintenance of cooperation induced 
by punishment in public goods games. Chin Phys B, 2010, 19: 
100204 
26 Wang Z, Xu Z, Zhang L. Punishment in optional public goods games. 
Chin Phys B, 2010, 19: 110201  
27 Wang Z, Du W, Cao X, et al. Integrating neighborhoods in the evalu-
ation of fitness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilem-
ma game. Physica A, 2011, 390: 1234–1239 
28 Rong Z, Wu Z. Effect of the degree correlation in public goods game 
on scale-free networks. Europhys Lett, 2009, 87: 30001  
29 Zhang H, Liu R, Wang Z, et al. Aspiration-induced reconnection in 
spatial public-goods game. Europhys Lett, 2011, 94: 18006  
30 Cao X, Du W, Rong Z. The evolutionary public goods game on 
scale-free networks with heterogeneous investment. Physica A, 2010, 
389: 1273–1280 
31 Bai L H, Guo J Y. Optimal dynamic excess-of-loss reinsurance and 
multidimensional portfolio selection. Sci China Math, 2010, 53: 
1787–1804  
32 Wei Q L, Yan H. Evaluating returns to scale and congestion by pro-
duction possibility set in intersection form. Sci China Math, 2011, 54: 
831–844 
33 Yu R J, Zhou X L. Neuroeconomics: Opening the “black box” behind 
the economic behavior. Chinese Sci Bull, 2007, 52: 1153–1161 
34 Ma Y J, Long G L, Deng F G, et al. Cooperative three- and four- 
player quantum games. Phys Lett A, 2002, 301: 117–124 
 
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. 
 
